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Abandonment of Notice Requirement in Third-Party
Claims for Contribution Under the Civil Damage
Act: Hammerschmidt v. Moore
Joseph Hammerschmidt and Dwaine Beyer were the driv-
ers of two cars that collided during the early morning hours of
March 2, 1974.1 Hammerschmidt died as a result of injuries re-
ceived in the crash.2 On May 24, Beyer's automobile insurance
carrier, anticipating potential liability to the Hammerschmidt
family, sent a notice of claim for contribution3 to Michael and
Myra Moore, proprietors of a licensed liquor establishment,4
pursuant to provisions of the Minnesota Civil Damage Act re-
quiring that notice of damage actions be given within 120 days
of the accident.5 Beyer had allegedly patronized the Moores' li-
1. Hanmerschmidt v. Moore, 274 N.W.2d 79, 80 (Minn. 1978).
2. Id.
3. See notes 18-24 infra and accompanying text.
4. The Moores were proprietors of Coates Station Bar. See Brief for Ap-
pellants at 2, Hammerschmidt v. Moore, 274 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1978).
5. Act of June 4, 1969, ch. 952, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1855 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 340.951 (1978)). The Act provided:
From and after [July 1, 1969], every person who claims damages from
any municipal liquor store or from the licensee of any licensed liquor
establishment for or on account of any injury within the scope of Min-
nesota Statutes, Section 340.95, shall give a written notice to the gov-
erning body of the municipality or the licensee of the liquor
establishment, as the case may be, stating-(1) The time and date when, and person to whom such liquor was
sold, bartered, or given;
(2) The name and address of the person or persons who were in-jured or whose property was damaged;
(3) The approximate time and date and the place where any injury
to person or property occurred.
No error or omission in the notice shall void the effect of the notice,
if otherwise valid, unless such error or omission is of a substantially
material nature.
This notice shall be served within 120 days after the injury occurs,
and no action therefore shall be maintained unless such notice has
been given, and unless it is commenced within three years after such
injury. The time for giving the notice shall not include any period of
time next succeeding the occurrence of the injury during which the
person injured is incapacitated from giving such notice by reason of
the injury sustained.
Actual notice of sufficient facts to reasonably put the governing
body of the municipality or the licensee of the liquor establishment, as
the case may be, or its insurer, on notice of a possible claim, shall be
construed to comply with the notice requirements herein.
Any cause of action for injury heretofore caused by an intoxicated
person as a result of an illegal sale, barter, or gift of liquor and not
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quor establishment the night of the fatal collision.6 Beyer's in-
surance carrier never filed a claim for contribution, because on
March 10, 1976, the Hammerschmidt family released its claim
against Beyer7 and commenced a direct action against the
Moores under the Civil Damage Act,8 alleging that the Moores
had illegally sold liquor to Beyer on the night of the collision
and that Beyer's intoxicated condition caused the fatal acci-
dent.9
On September 29, 1976, over two and one half years after
the accident and without any prior notice of claim, the Moores,
defendants in the direct action, served a third-party complaint
on the proprietors of two other licensed liquor establish-
ments.10 The complaint alleged that the third-party defendants
barred by the existing statute of limitations may be brought within
three years after the cause of action accrued or within six months after
[July 1, 1969], whichever is later, if notice thereof is given within 120
days of [July 1, 1969].
Id.
6. Brief for Appellants at 2, Hammerschmidt v. Moore, 274 N.W. 2d 79
(Minn. 1978).
7. Such a release is called a Pierringer release, named after a release
used in a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d
182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1968). In states that permit the apportionment of liability
among several joint tortfeasors, a plaintiff may use a Pierringer release to re-
lease some joint tortfeasors from an action while reserving his right to sue the
remaining tortfeasors. See generally Simonett, Release of Joint Tortfeasors:
Use of the Pierringer Release in Minnesota, 3 WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 1 (1977).
8. The Minnesota Civil Damage Act provided:
Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other
person, who shall be injured in person or property, or means of sup-
port, by any intoxicated person, or by the intoxication of any person,
shall have a right of action, in his or her own name, against any person,
who shall by illegally selling, bartering, or giving intoxicating liquors,
have caused the intoxication of such person, for all damages sustained,
and all damages recovered by a minor under this act shall be paid ei-
ther to such minor or to his or her parent, guardian, or next friend, as
the court shall direct; and all suits for damages under this act shall be
by civil action in any of the courts of this state having jurisdiction
thereof.
Act of Apr. 18, 1911, ch. 175, 1 § 1, 1911 Minn. Laws 221 (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 340.95 (1978)).
The Civil Damage Act does not define an "illegal" transfer, nor does it spec-
ify the particular statute that describes an illegal transfer for the purposes of
the Act. Two Minnesota statutes proscribe the transfer of intoxicants to certain
individuals. One statute provides that it shall be unlawful for any person other
than a pharmacist to furnish liquor to any minor or to any intoxicated person.
MiNN. STAT. § 340.73(1) (1978). The second statute provides that "[n]o intoxi-
cating liquor shall be sold, furnished, or delivered for any purpose to any minor
or to any person obviously intoxicated or to any of the persons to whom sale is
prohibited by statute." MiNN. STAT. § 340.14(la) (1978).
9. See Hammerschmidt v. Moore, 274 N.W.2d 79, 80 (Minn. 1978).
10. The third-party defendants were Dennis Treml and Wallace
Woldengen, proprietors of the Round-Up Bar, and Gary Kummer and Joseph C.
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had illegally sold intoxicating liquor to Hammerschmidt and
that the Moores were therefore entitled to contribution from
the third-party defendants for any recovery awarded to the
Hammerschmidt family in the direct action."H The third-party
defendants moved for summary judgment in the contribution
action on the ground that the Moores had not complied with
the 120-day notice requirement of the Civil Damage Act.1 2 The
trial court granted the motion and entered a judgment dis-
missing the third-party complaint. The Moores appealed from
this judgment and the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the notice-of-claim provision of the Civil Damage
Act is not a condition precedent to third-party civil damage ac-
tions for contribution. Hammerschmidt v. Moore, 274 N.W.2d 79
(Minn. 1978).
At common law, a person who is injured by the act of an
intoxicated person has no remedy against the seller of the li-
quor.1 3 The rationale for this rule is that the proximate cause
of the injury is the act of drinking the liquor, not the act of sell-
ing it.14 Several states, however, have altered this general rule
by enacting dram shop legislation.1 5 In Minnesota, the Civil
Damage Actl6 gives persons injured as a result of illegal liquor
sales a cause of action against the liquor establishment. The
Kummer, proprietors of W-K Black Stallion Supper Club. See Brief for Appel-
lants at 2-3, Hammerschmidt v. Moore, 274 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1978).
11. Third-Party Complaint, Appellant's Brief at A-10, Hammerschmidt v.
Moore, 274 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1978).
12. Act of June 4, 1969, ch. 952, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1855 (current version at
MrNN. STAT. § 340.951 (1978)). See note 5 supra. The statute requires that per-
sons demanding damages from liquor vendors give notice of their claims within
120 days from the date of the injury involved.
13. See Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34, 70 N.W.2d 886, 891 (1955); Demge v.
Feierstein, 222 Wis. 199, 203, 268 N.W. 210, 212 (1936). See generally Note, New
Common Law Dramshop Rule, 9 CLEV. - MAR. L REV. 302 (1960); Comment,
Common Law Liability of Liquor Vendors, 12 BAYLOR L REV. 388 (1960).
14. See Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34, 70 N.W.2d 886, 891 (1955). See gener-
ally Note, supra note 13; Comment, upra note 13.
15. Dram shop laws, enacted as a result of the temperance movement in
the late nineteenth century, generally imposed civil liability upon the seller of
intoxicating liquor for all injury resulting from his sale. Seventeen states cur-
rently have such laws. See ALA. CODE tit. 6, § 6-5-71 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-21-103 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ArNN. § 30-102 (West 1975); GA. CODE
ANN. § 105-1205 (1968); Liquor Control Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-
Hurd 1978); IowA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 2002 (West 1964); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 436.22 (1978); MIN. STAT. § 340.95
(1978); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 11-101 (McKiniey 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-
06 (1975); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Page 1973); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.730
(1977); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 3-11-1 (1976) VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972); WiS.
STAT. § 176.35 (1976); WYO. STAT. § 12-5-502 (1977).
16. Act of June 4, 1969, ch. 952, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1855 (current version at
MirNN. STAT. § 340.95 (1978)).
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Act requires that every person claiming damages for such in-
jury must give notice to the liquor establishment within 120
days of the injury.17 The cause of action in Hammerschmidt,
however, was not a direct claim under the Act; rather, it was a
claim for contribution against a cotortfeasor.
A person who has discharged a tort claim for which he and
another person were liable may be entitled to indemnity or
contribution from the other.'8 At common law, courts have tra-
ditionally applied the rule enunciated in Merryweather v.
Nixan'9 that no right of contribution exists among joint
tortfeasors.2 0 Implicit in the opinions of these courts is an un-
17. Act of June 4, 1969, ch. 952, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1855 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 340.951 (1978)).
18. See American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Molling, 239 Minn. 74, 77-84, 57 N.W.2d
847, 850-53 (1953). See generally Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A
Uniform Practice, 1938 Wis. L. REv. 365, 369 ("[Contribution] is an equitable
device to redistribute the common burden rateably and in a fashion different
from that employed by the person to whom each one of the group is usually
answerable severally for the entire amount."); Leflar, Contribution and Indem-
nity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130 (1932).
As is usually done, the appellants (the Moores) in Hammerschmidt origi-
nally brought a claim for contribution or indemnification from respondents (D.
Treml, W. Woldengen, G. Kummer, and J. Kummer). See 274 N.W.2d at 80. Al-
though the purpose of both contribution and indemnity is to achieve an equita-
ble allocation of the plaintiff's damages, contribution ordinarily results in an
equal sharing of that burden while indemnity allows one who is secondarily lia-
ble and has discharged a common obligation to recover the entire amount he
has paid from the party who is primarily liable. See generally Leflar, supra; see
also Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 281 Minn. 417, 419 n.2, 161 N.W.2d 657, 658 n.2
(1968). The court treated appellants' claim as one for contribution, and it is
similarly treated in this Comment.
19. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). The joint tortfeasors in Merryweather
were intentional wrongdoers, and the case was decided at a time when all torts
were intentional. The case, however, is generally credited with originating the
rule that no right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors. But see Reath,
Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v.
Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176, 177-79 (1898). "[B]y the great weight of modern
common law authority, contribution is denied also as between joint tortfeasors
whose liability is based on negligence merely, as distinguished from intentional
wrongdoing." Leflar, supra note 18, at 130. See, e.g., Union Stock Yards Co. v.
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 196 U.S. 217, 228 (1905); Andromidas v. Theisen Bros., 94
F. Supp. 150, 156 (D. Neb. 1950); Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 712, 195
P. 389, 389 (1921); Village of Portland v. Citizens' Tel. Co., 206 Mich. 632, 644, 173
N.W. 382, 386 (1919); Public Serv. Ry. v. Matteucci, 105 N.J.L. 114, 116, 143 A. 221,
221-22 (1928); Royal Indem. Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 587, 173 N.E. 194, 195
(1930). See generally Note, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors in
Minnesota, 37 Mmnw. L. Rav. 470 (1953).
20. The term "joint tortfeasors" was defined in Paddock-Hawley Iron Co. v.
Rice, 179 Mo. 480, 78 S.W. 634 (1904). The court held that the term, as used in a
Missouri statute allowing contribution between joint tortfeasors, referred only
to persons between whom there was intentional unity or concert of action, and
did not refer to persons between whom there was merely an unintended con-
currence of activities producing the result. Id. at 494-95, 78 S.W. at 638. This
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willingness to aid persons whose conduct does not conform to
legal standards, particularly when such persons, in order to re-
cover contribution, must first establish their own culpability.
21
Statutes in a number of states22 have modified this common
law rule to allow contribution under certain circumstances,
23
and several jurisdictions, including Minnesota, have judicially
created a right to contribution by making exceptions to the gen-
eral rule.24
In cases in which several liquor vendors were jointly liable
for an injury because each had illegally sold liquor to a person
who subsequently caused that injury, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has allowed the injured plaintiff to join all of the liquor
vendors as defendants in a single action under the Civil Dam-
age Act 25 or to select one vendor as the sole defendant.26 Al-
definition was expanded in Kinloch Tel. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 268 Mo. 485, 496,
188 S.W. 182, 184 (1916), to refer to those tortfeasors involved in "a case of negli-
gent omission of duty on the part of several tortfeasors which concurred in
causing the injury, though there was no unity or concert of action on their
part." The term 'Joint tortfeasors," under its currently accepted definition, in-
cludes those tortfeasors in "all cases where there is joint liability for a tort,
whether the acts of those jointly liable were concerted, merely concurrent, or
even successive in point of time." Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362,
366 n.1 (Minn. 1977) (quoting Leflar, supra note 18, at 131 n.9).
21. "[T]he rule refusing contribution between joint tortfeasors is rooted in
[the] unwillingness of courts to aid persons whose conduct has not measured
up to legal standards." Leflar, supra note 18, at 132. See generally Reath, supra
note 19, at 176.
22. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 50, at 307 (4th ed.
1971); Hewes, The Evolution of Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors in Maine,
44 B.U. L. REv. 79, 83 & n.18 (1964); Note, Adjusting Losses Among Joint
Tortfeasors in Vehicular Collision Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 964, 981-982 & app. I
(1959); Comment, Joint Tortfeasors: Contribution--No Intentional Wrongdoing
Inference from Strict Liability Statute, 53 MmNN. L. REV. 1089, 1090-91 (1969).
23. Courts interpreting various statutes have denied contribution in cases
in which there was no unity or concert of action, see, e.g., Leflar, supra note 18,
at 131 n.9; in which the tortfeasor who paid the judgment is primarily liable, see,
e.g., Hays-Fendler Constr. Co. v. Traroloc Inv. Co., 521 S.W.2d 171 (Mo. 1975);
Hut v. Antonio, 95 N.J. Super. 62, 70, 229 A.2d 823, 828 (1967); and in which one
party has contracted to assume the liability of both through indemnification, see
e.g., Maxwell Bros. Inc. v. Deupree Co., 129 Ga. App. 254, 257, 199 S.E.2d 403, 405-
06 (1973).
24. See Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 281 Minn. 417, 421, 161 N.W.2d 657, 660
(1968); Underwriters at Lloyds v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 389-90, 208 N.W. 13, 14
(1926); Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 110-11, 33 N.W. 320, 320-21 (1887). In
both Ankeny and Underwriters, the court held that contribution is available
only to defendants who are guilty of no intentional wrongdoing or could not be
presumed to have known that they were doing illegal acts. The only statutory
mention of contribution in Minnesota is section 548.19, which allows a joint
debtor to continue the judgment in force in order to compel contribution from
his nonpaying joint debtors.
25. See, e.g., Hartwig v. Loyal Order of Moose, Brainerd Lodge No. 1246, 253
Minn. 347, 350, 91 N.W.2d 794, 798 (1958).
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though the Act itself does not explicitly provide the sole
defendant with a cause of action against other vendors also lia-
ble for the tort, the court has allowed that defendant, in a civil
damage action, to seek contribution from other liquor vendors
who contributed to the injury through illegal sales of alcohol.27
Hammerschmidt was the first case that required the Min-
nesota Supreme Court to consider the notice-of-claim provision
of the Civil Damage Act in the context of a third-party action
for contribution. 28 The court, however, had considered the par-
allel notice-of-claim provision of the Minnesota Tort Liability
Act 29 in third-party actions for contribution involving tort
claims against municipalities. Under that Act, the court had
consistently held that a municipality must receive notice of a
claim within the statutory period in order to be held liable for
contribution. 30
26. Joint tortfeasors are severally liable. E.g., Reader v. Ottis, 147 Minn.
335, 339, 180 N.W. 117, 118 (1920); McClellan v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 58 Minn.
104, 107, 59 N.W. 978, 979 (1894). Civil damage actions arising under section
340.95 sound in tort. Hammerschmidt v. Moore, 274 N.W.2d 79, 82 n.4 (Minn.
1978) (citing Dahl v. Northwestern Natl Bank, 265 Minn. 216, 221, 121 N.W.2d
321, 324 (1963)).
27. See Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 281 Minn. 417, 423, 161 N.W.2d 657, 660
(1968). In Skaja, the court held that the violation of a strict liability statute
does not raise a reasonable inference of intentional wrongdoing and that con-
scious intent to violate a statute or commit a wrongful act must be shown
before contribution will be denied. Id. See notes 18-24 supra and accompany-
ing text.
28. Connecticut is another state which requires that notice of claim be
given by the plaintiff to the principal defendant within a certain period after in-
jury (60 days). See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975). Connecticut,
however, has not had occasion to consider the notice of claim requirement in
the context of a third-party action for contribution.
29. Act of May 22, 1963, ch. 798, § 5, 1963 Minn. Laws 1398 (current version
at MwN. STAT. § 466.05(1) (1978). This statute provided:
Every person who claims damages from any municipality for or on ac-
count of any loss or injury within the scope of section 2 shall cause to
be presented to the governing body of the municipality within 30 days
after the alleged loss or injury a written notice stating the time, place
and circumstances thereof, and the amount of compensation or other
relief demanded. Failure to state the amount of compensation or other
relief demanded does not invalidate the notice; but in such case, the
claimant shall furnish full information regarding the nature and extent
of the injuries and damages within 15 days after demand by the munic-
ipality. No action therefor shall be maintained unless such notice has
been given and unless the action is commenced within one year after
such notice. The time for giving such notice does not include the time,
not exceeding 90 days, during which the person injured is incapacitated
by the injury from giving the notice.
30. See, e.g., Hansen v. D.M. & LR. Ry., 292 Minn. 503, 504, 195 N.W.2d 814,
815 (1972); McGuire v. Hennessy, 292 Minn. 429, 430-31, 193 N.W.2d 313, 314
(1971); Jensen v. Downtown Auto Park, Inc., 289 Minn. 436, 438-39, 184 N.W.2d
777, 778 (1971); American Auto Ins. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 259 Minn. 294,
297-98, 107 N.W.2d 320, 322-23 (1961) (dismissing an indemnity action because
[Vol. 64:863
CIVIL DAMAGE ACT
In Hammerschmidt, the Minnesota Supreme Court recog-
nized the continued viability of "those decisions describing the
statutory notice requirement in tort actions against municipali-
ties as 'the foundation necessary to maintain an action for con-
tribution or indemnity,' "31 but the court refused to reach such
a result under the Civil Damage Act. The court reasoned that
"it would be patently inequitable to allow an injured plaintiff to
select arbitrarily, whether intentionally or inadvertently, which
of several tortfeasors should be burdened with the entire obli-
gation for a wrongful act by delaying notice until there is little,
if any, time to seek out joint tortfeasors."32 In order to avoid
that possibility, the Hammerschmidt court held "that the no-
tice-of-claim provision is not a condition precedent to third-
party civil damage actions for contribution."33 The court sup-
ported this result by arguing that the notice requirement is
merely procedural and thus should not bar contribution. The
court also emphasized the nature of the role that the equitable
doctrine of contribution should play in civil damage actions:
first, allowing contribution without notice would discourage il-
legal liquor sales by eliminating the possibility of eventual es-
cape from payment of damages and, second, allowing
contribution without notice would spread the burden of paying
damages to those injured because of illegal liquor sales more
equitably in the liquor industry.34 The court concluded that a
claimants failed to provide timely notice of claim). See also White v. Johnson,
272 Minn. 363, 368-69, 137 N.W.2d 674, 680 (1965) (a defendant may maintain an
action for contribution against a municipality absent notice by the injured
plaintiff to the third-party defendant),
Nearly all other states, however, permit the third-party plaintiff (the princi-
pal defendant in the original suit) to join the municipality for contribution or
indemnification purposes despite improper notice or lack of notice. See, e.g.,
Olsen v. Jones, 209 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Iowa 1973); Cotham v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 260 Md. 556, 565-67, 273 A.2d 115, 120-21 (1971); Geiger v. Calumet
County, 18 Wis. 2d 151, 155-57, 118 N.W.2d 197, 199-200 (1962); Note, Notice of
Claim Under the Municipal Tort Claims Act--The Watchdog with Plenty of
Teeth, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 670, 672 (1974).
31. 274 N.W.2d at 82 (quoting White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 372, 137
N.W.2d 674, 680 (1965)). In Hansen v. D.M. & I.R. Ry., 292 Minn. 503, 504, 195
N.W.2d 814, 815 (1972), and American Auto Ins. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 259
Minn. 294, 298, 107 N.W.2d 320, 323 (1961), the Minnesota court dismissed ac-
tions for contribution and indemnity respectively because the claimants failed
to provide timely notice of claim.
32. 274 N.W.2d at 83.
33. Id. at 82.
34. The Hammerschmidt court set out these policy considerations in a
lengthy quotation from Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 281 Minn. 417, 423, 161
N.W.2d 657, 661 (1968). See 274 N.W.2d at 83. It should be noted that these argu-
ments about the ultimate frustration of the remedial and regulatory purposes
of the Civil Damage Act, drawn from Skaja, are more persuasive in the context
1980]
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rule making notice an absolute prerequisite for civil damage
contribution actions would diminish the importance of the role
of contribution in civil damage actions, thereby frustrating the
objectives of the Civil Damage Act.35
The first of the Hammerschmidt court's three arguments 36
is that an essentially procedural limitation on liability, such as
the notice-of-claim requirement, should not allow a joint
tortfeasor to avoid payment of damages for a pre-existing com-
mon liability. The Minnesota Supreme Court had developed its
concept of pre-existing common liability in White v. Johnson3 7
and Spitzack v. Schumacher.38 In White, the court held that a
defendant could preserve a third-party claim against a munici-
pality for either contribution or indemnity by personally giving
the statutory notice of claim, despite any failure of the plaintiff
to give the municipality such notice.39 In reaching that result,
the court noted that the city's alleged common liability arose at
the time the injury occurred, but that-notice from someone was
a "practical" condition precedent to bringing suit.40 In
Spitzack, the defendant had attempted to implead alleged joint
tortfeasors who had earlier been adjudged not liable in a suit
by the plaintiff.4 1 The court affirmed a dismissal of the im-
of that case. In Skaja, the defendants in the third-party contribution action at-
tempted to escape liability for contribution because they had settled with the
injured plaintiffs and secured a'covenant not to sue from them. A contrary re-
sult in that case would have allowed the plaintiff in the original suit and a joint
tortfeasor to abrogate ex parte the principal defendant's right to contribution
from that joint tortfeasor.
35. 274 N.W.2d at 83.
36. In addition to the three arguments treated individually in this Com-
ment, the court was concerned that if it insisted on notice in contribution ac-
tions, delayed notification of a principal defendant by the direct-action plaintiff
might forestall the defendant's opportunity to bring-a third-party action for con-
tribution against other joint tortfeasors. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
The court, however, could have required notice in contribution actions and still
avoided that danger by allowing the principal defendant 120 days following his
receipt of notice from the plaintiff in which to notify any potential third-party
contribution defendants. See text accompanying notes 62-63 infra.
37. 272 Minn. 363, 137 N.W.2d 674 (1965).
38. 308 Minn. 143, 241 N.W.2d 641 (1976).
39. 272 Minn. at 371, 137 N.W.2d at 680. The court considered the giving of
notice under the notice provision of the Minnesota Tort Liability Act, ch. 798,
§ 5, 1963 Minn. Laws 1398 (current version at Mm. STAT. § 466.05(1) (1978)) to
be "a condition precedent to bringing suit for the practical purpose of quickly
informing a municipality of injuries for which it might be liable." 272 Minn. at
370, 137 N.W.2d at 679. According to the court, "this purpose is served as well
by notice from a joint wrongdoer as from an injured party." Id. at 372, 137
N.W.2d at 680.
40. Id. at 370-71, 137 N.W.2d at 679-80.




pleader action against the third-party defendants because of
the lack of common liability.4 2 In affirming the dismissal, the
Spitzack court distinguished several other cases in language
that was later quoted in Hammerschmidt:
[I]n all of these cases the defenses were procedural in nature and did
not go to the merits of the case. The defenses of release, [and] statute
of limitations... do not deny liability, but rather avoid liability. Thus,
the underlying common liability was never extinguished and a joint
tortfeasor's right to contribution was allowed
4 3
The Hammerschmidt court concluded that, in light of the
concept of pre-existing common liability drawn from White,
"the notice-of-claim provision [of the Civil Damage Act], for
purposes of contribution, is no different than the running of a
statute of limitations against one cotortfeasor but not an-
other."44 The court did not further explain this reasoning ex-
cept by the quotation from Spitzack stating that defenses such
as the statute of limitations are procedural rather than substan-
tive.45 If the Hammerschmidt court had concluded that timely
notice of claim were a prerequisite to a suit for contribution, it
could have been argued that the court was setting a deadline
beyond which suit could not be brought, much like the deadline
set by the statute of limitations. It seems clear, however, that
while statutes of limitations are intended to offer potential de-
fendants repose by prescribing time periods within which
rights of action must be enforced,4 6 120-day notice require-
ments are designed to give defendants a fair opportunity to
42. Id. at 149, 241 N.W.2d at 645.
43. Id. at 145-46, 241 N.W.2d at 643, quoted in Hammerschmidt v. Moore, 274
N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn. 1978).
44. 274 N.W.2d at 82.
45. Id. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. Analogies should not be
drawn to Gustafson v. Johnson, 235 Minn. 358, 51 N.W.2d 108 (1952), the case the
Spitzack and Hammerschmidt courts cited as originally establishing the rule
that "'an injured party's failure to bring an action... within the statute of lim-
itations [does not relieve] a tortfeasor of his liability to a joint tortfeasor for
contribution."' 274 N.W.2d at 81-82 (emphasis in original) (quoting Spitzack v.
Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 145, 241 N.W.2d 641, 643 (1976)). Gustafson did not
address that issue at all; rather, it was concerned with whether third-party de-
fendants could be impleaded into the original suit before the cause of action for
contribution had "matured" through payment by the named defendant of more
than his share of the joint obligation. See 235 Minn. at 364, 51 N.W.2d at 112.
The discussion in text assumes that the court would act consistently with the
Spitzack and Hammerschmidt characterization of the Gustafson holding if an
appropriate fact situation were presented to it.
46. See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L.
REV. 1177, 1185-86 (1950), cited with approval in Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 280
Minn. 147, 153 n.2, 158 N.W.2d 580, 584 n.2 (1968); Bachertz v. Hayes-Lucas Lum-




prepare for trial. 47 Thus, the court's identical treatment of the
two does not address their significant functional differences. 48
This judicial disregard of notice requirements is more difficult
to justify because the legislature probably enacted such re-
quirements in response to a perceived need for relatively quick
notification.
The Hammerschmidt court also relied on equitable princi-
ples to justify its result, reasoning that not making notice a pre-
requisite to a suit for contribution would strengthen liquor
vendors' incentive to avoid illegal sales. 49 The court believed
that a contrary result would reduce this incentive because
some vendors might escape payment for a common liability
arising from their illegal sales if the injured plaintiff elected hot
to sue all liable vendors and gave notice to a single vendor so
near the statutory time limit that the defendant vendor could
not give timely notice of a contribution action to other ven-
dors.50 This sequence of events, however, probably would
rarely occur, and would therefore only rarely encourage the
carelessness on the part of liquor establishments that was
feared by the court. Moreover, because the court's decision al-
lows a vendor to more easily acquire contribution, his fear of
liability is likely to be reduced since he need not be concerned
that the injured plaintiff will fortuitously choose him as the
sole defendant. In any event, it seems improbable that liquor
vendors, such as the third-party defendants in Hammer-
schmidt, consider whether a patron has visited or will visit
other liquor establishments at the time they decide whether to
47. A defendant will have an inadequate opportunity to prepare for trial if
he learns of his possible liability too late to investigate the plaintiffs claim or to
prove his lack of culpability. Chief Justice Sheran noted in his dissenting opin-
ion in Hammerschmidt that the "purpose of the statutory requirement [of the
Minnesota Civil Damage Act] that notice of claim be served 'within 120 days
after the injury occurs' is to permit the alleged supplier of liquor to investigate
the claim before witnesses disappear and memories fail-practical considera-
tion uniquely pertinent in situations of this kind." 274 N.W.2d at 83 (Sheran,
C.J., dissenting) (quoting Mim. STAT. § 340.951 (1978)). See also Donahue v.
West Duluth Lodge No. 1478 of the Loyal Order of Moose, 308 Minn. 284, 286-87,
241 N.W.2d 812, 814 (1976); Hirth v. Village of Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 79, 143
N.W.2d 205, 207-08 (1966).
Although it could be argued that statutes of limitation also promote the ob-
jective of avoiding stale claims that are difficult to investigate, statutes of limi-
tation allow far more than 120 days to elapse and thus only slightly promote
such a goal. In addition, statutes of limitation apply to a broader group of di-
rect claims, giving one more reason to believe that the parties will be aware of
potential lawsuits without either notice or service of process.
48. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
49. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
50. 274 N.W.2d at 83. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
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sell liquor to him. If vendors do not contemplate possible tort
liability when they serve liquor it is unrealistic to assume that
the availability of contribution actions will alter vendors' be-
havior.5 1
The court also argued that not imposing a notice require-
ment for contribution actions under the Civil Damage Act
would distribute the burden of economic loss more equitably
throughout the liquor industry.5 2 Forcing parties who have not
received notice to share economic loss hardly seems more equi-
table. Although a notice requirement occasionally allows guilty
parties to avoid liability, the reason for requiring notice is to al-
low sufficient time for liquor establishments to gather the evi-
dence needed to avoid excessive liability.53 The court dealt
summarily with this purpose, stating: "Our holding does not
frustrate the general purpose of the notice requirement since
third-party defendants would have access to the pleadings and
discovery processes in the original litigation and would be able
to complete such discovery as would be necessary to aid their
investigation."5 4 Access to discovery by another party, how-
ever, does not adequately replace the opportunity for in-
dependent investigation that notice affords. Moreover, the
51. The availability of liquor vendor liability insurance also tends to
weaken any deterrence argument. In addition, adopting the proposal to simply
allow principal (direct-action) defendants 120 days in which to notify contribu-
tion (third-party) defendants, as described in the text accompanying notes 62-
63 infra, would counter the deterrence argument in this case.
52. 274 N.W.2d at 83. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
53. See note 47 supra. The justification for notice requirements seems
even stronger under the Civil Damage Act than under the Minnesota Tort Lia-
bility Act (MTLA), despite the court's stronger support for the municipal notice
provision. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text. Liquor sales are often
made to individuals whom the liquor vendor does not know personally, so he
will often have no way of knowing about his possible liability in a particular
case until he receives notice of a claim. To rebut a claim against him, a defend-
ant needs to determine whether he sold liquor to the already intoxicated per-
son, how much that person had drunk before coming to defendant's
establishment, whether that person drank elsewhere after leaving the defend-
ant's premises, and whether that person's intoxication caused the plaintiff's in-
jury. Without prompt investigation, the evidence needed to prove these
matters may be difficult to obtain.
Giving a defendant notice of the claim against him has been recognized in
other contexts. For instance, Justice Frankfurter commented:
No better instrument has been devised for arriving at the truth than to
give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him
and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for gener-
ating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice
has been done.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refuge Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
54. 274 N.W.2d at 83 n.6.
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crucial issue in a contribution action is likely to be what actu-
ally occurred on the premises of the third-party defendant.
Since this issue would have been peripheral to the direct ac-
tion, it is unlikely that the two original parties would have
made the extensive investigation necessary for a third-party
defendant.
The result in Hammerschmidt, as Chief Justice Sheran rec-
ognized in his dissent,55 is clearly inconsistent with analogous
cases interpreting the nearly identical notice requirement of
the Minnesota Tort Liability Act (MTLA) dealing with the tort
liability of municipalities. 56 To maintain a contribution action
under the MTLA, a third-party plaintiff must provide notice to
the third-party defendant within the statutory period; after
Hammerschmidt, a third-party plaintiff in a Civil Damage Act
contribution action need not give notice. There appears to be
no reason to distinguish between municipal third-party defend-
ants and third-party defendants under the Civil Damage Act. If
anything, because of the high volume and relative anonymity
associated with liquor sales, liquor vendors must investigate
claims quickly and are thus in greater need of speedy notice
than municipalities.5 7
In several cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court has had se-
rious doubts about the constitutionality of the legislation re-
quiring plaintiffs to give notice of claims to municipalities but
not to other tort defendants.58 In Hammerschmidt, the court it-
55. "The majority opinion... ignores the clear legislative purpose of the
notice requirement in [the Minnesota Civil Damage Act] and, in effect, over-
rules our own recent precedents." Id. at 84 (Sheran, C.J., dissenting).
56. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
57. See note 53 supra.
58. In Frasch v. City of New Ulm, 130 Minn. 41, 153 N.W. 121 (1915), the
court addressed the question of whether distinctions between private and mu-
nicipal defendants were constitutional. The court held: "[T]he legislature is
not, because of similarity of liability, precluded from making distinctions be-
tween municipalities and private corporations in respect to conditions prece-
dent to suit." Id. at 43, 153 N.W. at 122. However, in the more recent case of
Olander v. Sperry & Hutchison Co., 293 Minn. 162, 197 N.W.2d 438 (1972), the
court stated: "Although plaintiff raises the question of whether § 466.05 trans-
gresses constitutional limits, we need not discuss that issue as we dispose of
the appeal on other grounds. It should be noted, however, that judicial pa-
tience should not be confused with judicial impotence, especially where consti-
tutional rights may be concerned." Id. at 164-65, 197 N.W.2d 446. Three years
later, concurring justices argued that the 30-day municipal notice-of-claim re-
quirement was unconstitutional. Jenkins v. Board of Educ., 303 Minn. 437, 442,
228 N.W.2d 265, 269 (1975) (Todd, J., concurring, joined by Kelly & Scott, J.J.).
See Kelly v. City of Rochester, 304 Minn. 328, 330, 231 N.W.2d 275, 276 (1975);
Altendorfer v. Jandric, Inc., 294 Minn. 475, 481, 199 N.W.2d 812, 816-17 (1972);
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self 5 9 drew a similar distinction between contribution defend-
ants under the MTLA and the Civil Damage Act. Moreover,
because the court lacks the broad authority of the legislature to
draw public policy distinctions,60 the legitimacy of its own ac-
Note, Notice of Claim Requirement Under the Minnesota Municipal Tort Liabil-
ity Act, 4 WM. MrrCHEIL L. REV. 93, 105-06 & n.109 (1978).
In a recent case, Kossak v. Stalling, 277 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1979), the court
held unconstitutional the requirement of section 466.05(1), see note 29 supra,
that suit be commenced within one year of notice. Id. at 35. In support of its
result, the court cited portions of the opinions in Olander, Jenkins, Kelly, and
Altendorfer that questioned the constitutionality of the municipal notice provi-
sion of section 466.05(1). Id. at 33-35. In Kossak, however, the court did not
reach the constitutionality of the notice requirement itself-thus, its constitu-
tional status remains uncertain.
59. In Hirth v. Village of Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 143 N.W.2d 205 (1966),
the court vigorously defended the notice requirement of the Minnesota Tort Li-
ability Act. There, the plaintiff suffered personal injury as a result of the negli-
gence of municipal employees who fraudulently concealed their negligence
until after the statutory notice period. The court refused to allow the action be-
cause of the lack of statutory notice, reasoning
To find in the case before us that the municipality is estopped from as-
serting the defense of failure to notify would be to undermine the pur-
poses of the statute and invade the legislative prerogative. Were we to
adopt plaintiff's arguments, we would, in effect, be amending the stat-
ute contrary to legislative intent clearly revealed by the statute's legis-
lative history. The legislature had had before it ... cases where
hardship was the result of strict enforcement of the statute. Yet, the
only response was an amendment in 1959 granting to those who are
physically or mentally incapacitated as a result of the injury for which
they claim relief an extension of time "not in excess of 90 days" to fe
notice. It is apparent, therefore, that the legislature is adamant in ad-
hering to the strict requirements of the statute as applied in Johnson
and similar cases, regardless of hardship.
Id. at 79, 143 N.W.2d at 207-08 (footnote omitted).
60. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 729-30 (1963) (" '[T] he
proper course is to recognize that a state legislature can do whatever it sees fit
to do unless it is restrained by some express prohibition in the constitution of
the United States or of the State. . . .' [w] e have returned to the original con-
stitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic
beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.")
(quoting Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting)); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). In contrast to
the views of Justices Black and Holmes, Justice Harlan interpreted more
broadly the power of the courts to invalidate legislation on constitutional
grounds. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). He
made it clear, however, that "it is the Constitution alone which warrants judi-
cial interference in sovereign operations of the State." Id. at 539-40. It thus ap-
pears that when interpreting statutes, courts must ground their decisions
either in their power to ascertain the intent of the legislature or in their power
to determine the constitutionality of statutes.
The court's action in Hammerschmidt has created a distinction among
claims against municipalities that was not made by the legislature. When the
legislature added the notice requirement to the Civil Damage Act in 1969, it
provided that notice be given to municipalities operating a municipal liquor
store as well as liquor licensees. See note 5 supra. That provision was consis-
tent with the general MTLA notice requirement. See Act of May 22, 1963, ch.
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tion is questionable. 61
Whatever constitutional problems might be created by the
result in Hammerschmidt, the central shortcoming of the deci-
sion is the court's lack of concern for the purposes of the statu-
tory notice provision. The court was understandably concerned
with the possibility that an injured plaintiff's last-minute notice
might prevent the defendant's suit for contribution,62 but it
should have reached a result consonant with the legislative re-
quirement of notice. It could have achieved such a result by al-
lowing the initial defendant to bring a third-party action for
contribution if he gave notice within 120 days of his own receipt
of notice from the plaintiff. Such a rule would be a more mod-
erate solution to the problem the court perceived and would be
consistent with the legislative decision to allow the initial plain-
tiff 120 days to give notice. In any event, it seems clear that any
deference to the purposes of the statutory notice requirement
would have required a different outcome in Hammerschmidt
since the appellants waited a full twenty-eight months after
their own receipt of notice before notifying the respondents. 63
The Hammerschmidt court's purpose was to ensure that li-
quor vendors who make illegal liquor sales do not entirely es-
cape liability for resulting injury.64 The ease with which the
court departed from the reasoning of the municipal notice
cases may indicate that it considered liquor vendors to be less
deserving of notice than municipalities. Hammerschmidt obvi-
ously makes contribution more readily available to liquor deal-
ers by not imposing the requirement of timely notice upon
third-party plaintiffs. This Comment, however, has already
noted that greater access to contribution may have no deter-
798, § 5, 1963 Minn. Laws 1398 (current version at MImN. STAT. § 466.05 (1978)).
The decision in Hammerschmidt, by abolishing the requirement of notice to li-
quor vendors in contribution actions, creates a new distinction between munici-
palities that are third-party defendants in dram shop tort actions and those that
are third-party defendants in other tort actions.
61. Although the MTLA and Civil Damage Act contain similar require-
ments of notice from "every person who claims damages," see notes 5 and 29
supra, neither statute specifically mentions contribution actions. The court
could, therefore, legitimately maintain that neither statute was intended to ex-
tend to contribution actions if it could discover a significant distinction between
the importance of giving notice in contribution actions and the importance of
giving notice in direct actions. The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, did
not articulate any such distinction in Hammerschmidt. In fact, the court
reached contradictory results under the MTLA and Civil Damage Acts without
offering either a constitutional or interpretative justification.
62. 274 N.W.2d at 83. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
63. 274 N.W.2d at 80.
64. Id. at 83. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
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rent effect on tortious liquor sales.65 If the Minnesota Legisla-
ture remains committed to the purposes of a notice
requirement, it should explicitly extend the civil damage notice
requirement to contribution actions.
65. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
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